Abstract: This paper assesses the accuracy of the common analogy by which contemporary Islamists are casually conflated with classical fascists. It argues that there are some parallels, in particular the manner in which Islamists and fascists, when pursuing their political agendas, are and were both deeply intolerant of "deviants" and prepared to readily deploy violence against opponents. But it also argues that the analogy remains substantially flawed: in the context of domestic politics, Islamists face authoritarian regimes prepared to use violence against them and which are therefore very different to the liberalist regimes the fascists faced. And from an international perspective the Islamists face great powers united in their determination to ensure they do not rise to power by "capturing" a state, unlike the fascists. While current changes in the Arab world may create conditions more amenable for Islamists to carry out "stealthy" take-overs, until such occur the analogy remains at best only partially valid.
Introduction
The word "Islamofascist" tars contemporary Islamists with a very noxious historical brush, explicitly equating them with fascists, and this paper explores the propriety of this analogy. It will initially be conceded that there are parallels which cannot be entirely dismissed, especially the manner in which both groups share a "totalitarian mind" which is (or was) the very antithesis of the tolerant "liberal mind". Yet there are also important differences which should not be papered over, and these are explored across two dimensions. First, Islamists typically do not face liberalist 1 parties in domestic electoral contests and instead, they typically contend against authoritarian regimes prepared to respond in kind with violence. Second, in the international context the Islamists face great powers who are united against and determined to defeat them, especially by preventing them "capturing the state" in HUMAN AFFAIRS 21, 7-17, 2011 DOI: 10.2478/s13374-011-0002-z the various Islamic societies in which they aspire to do so. The great powers also have long memories: an existential threat aspiring to overthrow the international system (the fascists) has arisen before, it was not "nipped in the bud" early, and around 60 million people died to extinguish it. Put simply, this paper argues that while the Islamofascist analogy is flawed, it is deeply ironic that its rhetorical deployment contributes to creating the very conditions which undermine its validity.
"Islamofascism" in Discourse, and Definitions
The term "Islamofascist" was first used in the early 1990s to describe Arab authoritarian regimes (Safire 2006) . Its current application to Islamists was initiated by Khalid Duran: responding to criticism of his book The Children of Abraham (Duran, Hechiche 2001) he noted that the Islamic clerics who issued fatwas against him were acting like fascists, trying to intimidate him into silence (Duran 2002) . Albert Scardino claims that the figure most responsible for popularising the term Islamofascist was Christopher Hitchens who, Scardino noted, "sprinkles Islamofascism around like paprika" (2005) . The term then rapidly crossed the Atlantic: New York Times columnist Tomas Friedman wrote about "the Islamic fascism of Osama bin Laden" (2002); neoconservative guru Norman Podhoretz used it in the sub-title of a book (2007); and even George W. Bush used it regularly (2005, 2006) . Since then the analogy has been liberally deployed by politicians, from "mainstreamers" like then Prime Minister of Australia John Howard (2006) to those on the "fringe" like French National Front leader Marine Le-Pen (AFP 2010). It is favoured by right-wingers, while critics tend to be either Muslims (Green 2006) , or left-wingers like Professor Juan Cole determined to resist the automatic conflation of Islam per se with fascism (2005). Granted, Michael O'Haloran of the Brookings Institute (a "centre-left" think-tank) has defended its use because it "calls attention to the overtly Islamic quality of the extremist movement" (Washington Times, 2006) . Nevertheless, in the poisonous political climate pervading contemporary Washington the word has acquired openly partisan connotations.
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To determine whether the Islomfascist analogy is accurate requires definition of the terms Islamist and fascist. Nowadays "Islamist" is synonymous with "Islamic extremist" and "Islamic fundamentalist". Richard T. Antoun, in describing "religious fundamentalism as a cross-culturally applicable concept" says: [B] roadly, it refers to an orientation to the world, both cognitive and affective. The affective, or emotional, orientation indicates outrage and protest against (and also fear of) change, and against a certain ideological orientation … [namely] modernism…. The ethos of fundamentalism … is one of protest and outrage at the secularization of society (2008, 3) .
Islamists therefore pursue a political agenda, resisting the relegation of religion to the private realm, seeking to "call a halt to the centuries-long retreat of the religious establishments before the secular power" (Almond, Appleby, Sivan 2003, 2) and they typically demand the re-implementation of strict shar'ia law and re-establishment of a "universal Caliphate" 3 to fuse secular and religious authority. For example, Al-Qaeda recently called for Egyptian anti-government protesters to reject the "ignorant, deceiving ways of impious democracy and rotten, pagan nationalism" and to instead engage in violent jihad, saying "the doors of martyrdom have opened" (AFP 2011). In such a short essay the meaning of Islamist must be restricted, so it will not be applied herein to the Sh'ia Islamism practiced by the current Iranian regime; 4 and, it does not refer to "moderate Islamists" like those ruling Turkey.
5 Instead, it is applied only to Sunni groups who agitate for absolutist, theocratic rule and who advocate (or have links to groups which do so) the use of political violence to achieve their ends-it is Islamist groups like these which are, in any event, the ordinary targets of the Islamofascist label.
Defining fascism seems easier because everybody is familiar with the term-or at least they think they are-which is why it can be harder, given that the term "fascist" and its sibling "Nazi" are used so commonly they have become abused. 6 To avoid confusion, it is defined in two ways in this paper. First, because it is a variety of totalitarianism, Carl J. Friedrich's classic definition is offered: totalitarian regimes embody:
(1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police: and (4) three kinds of monopoly or, more precisely, monopolistic control: namely that of (a) mass communications; (b) operational weapons; (c) all organizations, including economic ones (Barber, Curtin, Friedrich 1969, 126) .
With respect to fascism, A. James McGregor characterised it as a "revolutionary movement regime which aspired to commit the totality of human and natural resources of an historic community to national development". Admittedly, he saw Nazi Germany as "an anomalous fascist power [because] its charismatic object of loyalty … proved to be not [just] the nation but an ill-defined … racial confraternity" (1969, xii-xii) , resulting in certain racial Others (Jews and Slavs especially) being fiercely repressed. Nevertheless, in this paper "fascism" describes the ultra-nationalist movements that flourished in inter-war Europe, especially those associated with Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany.
The Totalitarian Mind
The Islamofascist analogy is accurate to the extent that Islamists and fascists share a similar mind-set. This, put simply, is one of deep intolerance for political opinions that deviate from their own. They are both diametrically opposed to the basic principles of liberalism represented by J.S. Mill's "harm principle", by which government should allow citizens the maximum freedom possible to pursue their conception of "the good life", and restrict only those actions which impinge upon others' freedom (1985 [1859] ). This "negative freedom", according to Isaiah Berlin, should generally be preferred by liberals over "positive freedom", which implies the claim that it is "possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal … which they would, if they were more enlightened, themselves pursue, but do not, because they are blind or ignorant or corrupt" (Berlin 1958) .
Totalitarians, including fascists, typically subscribed to a very radical variety of positive freedom. Mussolini's doctrine of "thought and action", derived from Guiseppe Mazzini, required that progressive ideas should not just be presented persuasively, but must also be imposed, if necessary, upon the obstructive elements of society. Lest anyone conflate such principles with Marxism, Mussolini rejected the necessity of class conflict and instead demanded that "national unity" was required for such a programme to succeed (Radel 1975, 39-42) . The Nazis were also committed to social improvement and material progress, despite differences regarding how to achieve such (i.e. through the dominant agency of a biologically superior race, the Aryans: McGregor 1969, 19-22) . Fascists, then, typically aspired to "utopian" goals (Barber et al., ix): Hans Buchheim perhaps puts it best when he said fascism "is the claim transformed into political action that the world and social life are changeable without limit" (1962, 14) .
More pertinently, the fascists demanded total obedience to their creeds and programmes. Brzezinski notes that totalitarian regimes advance their goals in "an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population" (1967, 29) and Friedrich argues that what distinguishes totalitarian regimes from authoritarian ones is the former's determination to assert "total control [over] the everyday lives of its subjects … of their thoughts and attitudes, as well as their activities" (Barber et al., . To achieve this fascist regimes typically created a system based the "glorification of violence" (ibid.,141-143) and by monopolising the coercive apparatus of the state on the one hand, and the media on the other, they were able to "accomplish their [utopian] tasks: terror and consent become Siamese twins" (ibid.,144).
Such regimes eliminated what would be called "civil society" in a liberal democracy, thereby destroying any source of authority other than the state itself.
There are obvious parallels between the goals or purposes of fascists and those professed by Islamists. The concept of secularism is a distinctively Western, even Christian 7 concept; as Bernard Lewis explains, [t] he persecutions endured by the early church made it clear that a [church-state] separation was possible; the persecutions inflicted by the later churches persuaded many Christians that such a separation was necessary (2002, 107) . However, he notes that the situation has traditionally been very different in Islam:
Muhammed was his own Constantine. In the religiously conceived polity he founded … [he] confronted the realities of the state…. The idea that any group of persons, any kind of activities, any part of human life is in any sense outside the scope of religious law and jurisdiction is alien to Muslim thought. There is, for example, no distinction between cannon law and civil law.… There is only a single law, the shar'ia, accepted by Muslims as of divine origin (ibid.,111).
It is surely this "totalist" aspect of the Islamist interpretation of Islam, the manner in which Islamists demand absolute compliance with their interpretation of what the divine will requires without any space whatsoever for compromise, which most fuels the Islamofascist analogy. And it is hard to deny the validity of the parallel with fascism, at least in this narrow purposive sense. Antoun (2008, 85) notes that the Qur'an commands "ever will God change the condition of a people unless they change it themselves", and goes on to explain that "This verse provides the appropriate scriptural basis for the focus of [Islamic] activism and totalism…. Militant movements [aim] to take religion out of the mosque … and into the home, schools, the markets and factories, into the streets … [etc.]".
There seems to be little room for doubt that if an Islamist group did capture the state in an Islamic society they would create a substantially totalitarian regime similar in type to those erected by the fascists after they rose to the pinnacle of power. Demands for the fusion of religious and secular authority are common to virtually all Islamist movements, whether they be widely-supported groups attempting to overthrow the state in Muslim-majority societies, as the Islamic Salvation (Esposito 2002, chap. 2) . Their use of violence thereby receives, as they see it, divine sanction, not unlike the way fascists justified their atrocities in the pursuit of higher purposes.
Consider just four examples of jihad-directed activities which occurred within a few weeks either side of Christmas 2010: Islamists tried again (unsuccessfully) to extract revenge on Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper which provoked the "Danish Cartoons" affair (Stewart 2011) ; Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula advised "pious and true Muslims" to engage in drug-dealing, kidnapping and murder (of non-Muslims) to fund jihad (Al-Awlaki 2011); a Pakistani politician was assassinated by his Islamist bodyguard after the former's call for the country's blasphemy laws to be reformed was itself deemed blasphemous by Islamists (Welsh 2011) ; and after an Islamist blew himself up in Stockholm the UK-based group he had belonged to (al-Muhajiroun) lauded him as a martyr to recruit suicide bombers (Lewis 2010) . Indeed, while Hamas provides an excellent example of how Islamists glorify violence by praising martyrs in posters, public proclamations and key chains (Antoun 2008, 101) and while it consistently refuses to renounce its determination to ultimately destroy Israel (The Times 2006), its recent pragmatic call for a "long-term ceasefire" with Israel (Reuters 2010) ironically led to its officials being declared legitimate targets of assassination by splinter Islamist groups operating in Gaza (Khatib 2011).
Differences: Domestic and International Contexts
Yet while Islamists pursue totalist political purposes and employ violent methods, past this point the Islamofascist analogy wears thin. And even before then there are inconsistencies: regarding purposes, fascists tended to be "forward looking" and modernist while Islamists are more "backward-looking" and anti-modernist. And the differences are even greater when it comes to the methods each employed.
But before we examine this last matter it should be noted, more generally, that the historical context (especially the domestic-political aspects of such) between the interwar and contemporary eras differs significantly. Erich Fromm famously argued that, psychologically, the German people (and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the Italians) were deeply traumatised by World War I and the economic aftershocks which followed it, meaning both peoples were, in a sense, "ripe for the picking" when figures with authoritarian personalities (Mussolini and Hitler) appeared promising them simple solutions to their travails (1942) . A similar argument explains the meteoric rise of Napoleon (Hobsbawm 1962, chap. 3). The situation is arguably very different in the contemporary Muslim world. Regarding the collective psychology of Islamic societies, despite the fact that Eugene Rogan (2009) and Bernard Lewis (2002) both argue that the Arabs and Muslims more widely, respectively, have suffered cultural humiliation, foreign interference and economic stagnation in the past century, the parallels with post-World War I Italy and Germany seem stretched. It is submitted here, then, that at minimum contemporary Islamic societies are not so "ready" as the Italian and German societies were in the inter-war period for take-over by radicalism. And in any event, the fascists operated in polities which contained radical left movements which also sought to take over the state, meaning that for many Italians and Germans the fascists must have seemed the "less-bad" option (Radel 1975, 73-90, 127-123; McGregor 1969, chap. 8) . There is no similar dynamic in contemporary Islamic societies: most nongovernmental opposition movements, other than Islamists, are avowedly non-violent liberal groups.
Regarding differences in method, while the fascists deployed political violence in the inter-war years during their rise to power, they did so in a relatively controlled manner, at least compared the current crop of Islamists. The fascists therefore practiced a degree of restraint in their deployment of violence prior to taking office: they formed secret cells to infiltrate the police and army, co-opting or intimidating opponents along the way; Mussolini's squadristi and Hitler's sturmabteilung beat on their political rivals with clubs during pitched street battles; and they occasionally murdered key political opponents. But despite these actions, and the combative rhetoric they employed at rallies, they were also careful to show 9 The literature on why the Weimar Republic collapsed is enormous. Many scholars emphasise the unwillingness of liberalist parties to resort to political violence to defeat fascism: Abraham, D. 1986; Bessel, R. 1990; Berman, S. 1997. 10 I count this as an Islamist group: despite the fact that it officially renounces violence, it retains strong links to groups that practice violence (Hamas, Islam Jihad etc.) and it seeks the establishment of a theocratic state based on shar'ia law.
an "espectable face", a "mask of restraint" so to speak, which they dropped only upon assuming office. They did not, therefore, target the general population with suicide bombings or the political elites with waves of assassinations prior to assuming power-Hitler clearly took to heart the lessons learnt after his failed Munich Beer-Hall Putsch of 1923.
Most importantly, however, the fascists faced regimes headed by fractious liberalist parties unwilling to "sink to their level" and stamp them out entirely (another lesson of the Beer Hall Putsch not lost on Hitler, who subsequently spent less than a year in prison).
9 This is probably the key reason why the Islamofascist analogy ultimately fails to convince this author. So, and with respect to domestic political/institutional matters, simply put, Islamists do not typically compete for power electorally in liberal-democratic polities. While 76% of the world's non-Muslim societies are democratic, only 23% of the Islamic ones are (Azra 2006, 3) and in the Arab world the picture is even starker: at the time of writing perhaps Iraq could be called (shakily) democratic, while Lebanon is less convincingly so; otherwise oneparty states, military dictatorships and monarchies prevail. There is much debate about the cause of this phenomenon (Fish 2002; Karatnycky 2002; Zakaria 2004) but in this essay the effect is what matters: Islamist groups are either co-opted and muzzled or violently repressed by illiberal regimes.
The case of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 10 is illustrative. Banned in Egypt in 1954, it has been repressed savagely several times since and was only grudgingly allowed to participate in politics, and then only under tight restrictions, in the past decade or so (Stratfor 2011a) . It is tightly controlled in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait on the understanding that it would be suppressed if it caused trouble, and to belong to it is a capital offense in Syria and Libya, as it was in Iraq until recently (Rogan 549) . Its offshoot, Hamas, did win the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Authority, but by July 2007 its dispute with Fatah erupted into open bloodshed: Hamas then expelled Fatah from Gaza and Fatah returned the favour in the West Bank. Since then the West has supported the determined Israeli/ Egyptian blockade of Gaza. In short, the spectre of Islamists winning elections haunts both the West and the authoritarian regimes across the Middle East (Hertzog 2006; Long 2010) and leads to the oft-remarked upon alleged hypocrisy by which the democratic West supports authoritarianism in the Middle East as the "least-bad option" (Bellin 2004) . And of course the only other example we have of a Sunni Islamist group capturing the state, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan, resulted in a regime we would all readily recognise as "totalitarian in character", suggesting the deep suspicions about Islamists are not entirely unreasonable.
A revolution in Egypt has just toppled the Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak and sparked speculation concerning whether the MB may "hijack" the popular revolution like the Ayatollahs did in Iran in 1979 (Stratfor 2011b) . MB representatives claimed that it would not run a candidate in presidential elections for "several years" to allay the fear that it intends to turn Egypt into a theocracy (Al-Bayoumi 2011; Al-Ghazar 2011) , but another asserted that it would, if it came to power, vigorously seek to implement shar'ia law, and would "review" the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty while offering "tangible assistance" to Hamas (El-Helbawy 2011). In short, many commentators wonder whether the MB was deliberately "keeping a low profile" for tactical reasons while the anti-Mubarak protests raged, and is simply waiting for an opportunity to take over Egypt (Shane 2011; Black 2011; Sheriden 2011 ). If this occurs, then perhaps future events will demonstrate that the Islamist-fascist analogy is more accurate than is argued herein, although other reports suggest the Egyptian military, now in direct control, is determined to never allow such a thing to occur (Stratfor 2011c) .
The domestic context is also tied to the international context. In the narrow case of Egypt, Israel fears that an Egypt led by the MB would, at minimum, support Hamas' ongoing efforts to destroy Israel and, in the worst case, may spark another war akin to those in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 . Accordingly, the US has obvious interests in preventing Islamists coming to power in Egypt (Friedman 2011) . But in a wider sense the US has been directly and heavily engaged against Islamists for a decade in a number of theatres, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (where the Islamist threat to the democratically-elected government is multifaceted and complex: Shapiro & Fair 2010) , and it maintains operational forces in the Arabian peninsula and the Philippines, while various forms of anti-Islamist support have been provided to over a dozen other states. Few could doubt American determination to confront Islamism globally.
Just as importantly, most of the great powers have their own Islamist problems. India faces threats from Islamist groups based in (or supported by) Pakistan (Mohan 2006) . Russia continues to struggle with Islamists in the Caucuses and regular terrorist attacks in Moscow (Hahn 2007) . The Chinese have their own problems with Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang province, some of whom have ties to Central Asian and Pakistani Islamist groups (Chung 2002 ). Most of the major European powers, from Great Britain to France, Germany and Spain (along with a clutch of their EU-partners) have suffered terrorist attacks by Islamists. Perhaps the only states which could reasonably be considered "great powers" and who don't face an Islamist threat are Japan and Brazil-even Muslim Indonesia cooperates closely with its fellow "regional power" Australia to combat its own home-grown Islamist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (Chalk, Ungerer 2008) . The current international climate, then, is a far cry from that which prevailed in the inter-war period, when America was voluntarily isolationist, the Soviet Union was involuntarily isolated, and Britain and France were internally divided and set on appeasing the fascists. The Islamists therefore have far less opportunity to practice the sort of "divide and rule" strategy pursued so deftly by Hitler in particular during the 1930s, even if they were to capture the state in one or more Islamic societies.
Conclusion
There are some similarities between contemporary Islamists and classical fascists, in particular the totalist nature of their respective political creeds, and their willingness to use violence against their political opponents. But the parallels end there: their purposes differ in the details, their methods differ more, and most importantly, both the domestic and international contexts in which the Islamists operate are vastly different from those which the fascists faced in the 1930s as they strove to capture the Italian and German states. There is, of course, the possibility that the current wave of unrest sweeping the Arab world may create conditions more conducive to the Islamists, allowing them to employ fascist-like tactics to rise to power "stealthily" before imposing totalitarian theocratic rule. Yet the authoritarian regimes they oppose, and virtually all the great powers (especially the greatest, America), seem determined to not allow history to repeat itself. This is, therefore, the great irony behind the Islamofascist analogy: while substantially inaccurate, its rhetorical deployment contributes to preventing the conditions in which it became more valid coming to pass.
